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I. Introduction
Endangered species conservation efforts and the animal rights movement at
first glance seemingly align with one another, since both endeavors deal with
helping animals in some way. A closer examination, however, reveals how
arguments for animal rights and for endangered species conservation can conflict
morally.1) On the one hand, endangered species conservation entails focusing solely
on the safety and wellbeing of animals that belong to species that are facing the
threat of extinction. The lives of such animals are thus apparently treated as more
valuable than the lives of animals from species that are not facing the threat of
extinction, which runs contrary to some animal rights arguments that view each and
every animal as an individual being with moral worth. On the other hand, treating
all animals equally, irrespective of the population size of each species, accords with
certain animal rights perspectives that emphasize the moral worth of all animals as
individual entities. Doing so, however, fails to acknowledge the uniquely grave
moral implications of an entire species vanishing.
The central issue here, then, is the worth of animals: do the lives of animals
have any intrinsic value, or do they merely have extrinsic value? If every animal has
intrinsic value, then each animal’s life has value in and of itself, regardless of its
utility to human life or its contribution to the population of its species. If not, then
animal lives only have extrinsic value, which makes them valuable solely on the
basis of their utility to human interests and their contribution to the ecological
balance. This debate not only applies to individual animals, but to entire species as
well. Does any species have intrinsic value, or are all species reducible to their
extrinsic value with regard to their ecological role and their utility in the context of
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human interests? This paper will examine this latter question regarding the value of
animal species, with a specific focus on the development of endangered species
conservation efforts in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the end
of the twentieth century. As this paper will demonstrate, America’s primary piece of
legislation dedicated to species preservation, the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
seemingly posits that all species have intrinsic value insofar as the Act covers all
species that face the threat of extinction, regardless of taxonomic features or reasons
for their endangered status, and the Act’s provisions make it so that the threat of
extinction of any species can even override economic interests. However, as this
paper will also demonstrate, the development of this legislative protection in the
United States has been largely predicated on the extrinsic value of animal species,
and the actual implementation of protection efforts at times also seems predicated on
their extrinsic value.
II. The Apparent Intrinsic Value of
Animal Species in the Endangered Species Act
The 1973 Endangered Species Act appears to treat all animal species as
intrinsically valuable due to the provisions that place their survival as being of
paramount importance, with the potential to override even economic interests.
Though the Act obviously also includes plant species, the focus is primarily on
animal species.2) The Act stipulates that there are no discriminatory provisions that
prioritize one species over another, and so priority goes “to those endangered
species or threatened species, without regard to taxonomic classification,”3) that are
most likely to benefit from protective efforts. Additionally, the Act, as stated in
Section 4, subsection (b), (B)(2), (a)(3), further articulates that if scientific
assessments indicate that failure to designate an area as a critical habitat could lead
to the extinction of a species, then said area can be designated as such, even if the
benefits of not designating the area as such would otherwise outweigh the benefits
of designating the area as a critical habitat.4) In other words, if economic interests
relating to the habitat of an endangered species threaten its survival, then protecting
that habitat takes priority.
The scientific data that government agencies (particularly the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service) responsible for wildlife management act on, prescribes not
only mitigating the human impact on wildlife, but also the non­human impact.
Section 4 (A)(1) prescribes protection for all endangered species threatened by any
of the following: “(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial, recreational,
scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of
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existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting
its continued existence.”5) This reinforces just how sweeping the Endangered Species
Act’s protections are, for this means that all species facing the threat of extinction
are covered by its protective provisions, even if the threats do not result from
human activities. Endangered species are therefore protected by the Act even if a
species is endangered as a result of disease, predation, or other “natural” factors.
This means that although the Act was ostensibly crafted in order to protect wildlife
from the effects of human activities, it is in practice a law calling for every single
species to continue to exist in the wild.
In short, any species, whether seen as majestic, or completely inconspicuous to
the general public, is protected regardless of the reason for its endangerment, and in
this way the Endangered Species Act seems to posit all species as intrinsically
valuable. It is important to stress, however, that this does not apply to the individual
animals that comprise a species, insofar as an animal whose species is not
endangered is obviously not protected, and an animal whose species was
endangered, but later experienced sufficient population growth to warrant being
delisted as an endangered species, is no longer protected. The individual animals
that comprise an endangered species therefore only have extrinsic value according to
the provisions of the act, insofar as the concern is with preserving the species itself,
and if the population of a species is sizeable enough then the individual animals
cease to matter.
III. The Extrinsic Value of Animal Species
in America’s Early Conservation Efforts6)
The arrival of Europeans in North America transformed the continent’s
ecological balance, and by the seventeenth century several species had already gone
extinct, largely due to commercial hunting.7) This “New World,” as Europeans
viewed it, offered abundance that led to a new resource economy, with the skins,
pelts, and skulls of animals like beavers and minks proving financially valuable in
Europe.8) Large trading companies facilitated unregulated hunting and trading to
satisfy booming demand, which depleted many animal populations. Moreover, as
settlements spread across the continent, and in the American case, especially after
the Louisiana purchase from France in 1803 and the annexation of lands from
Mexico in 1848 after the Mexican­American War, expansion resulted in habitat
destruction and correlating declines in animal populations.
One species in particular warrants special attention: the bison (often
colloquially called buffalo). It had an iconic presence on the American plains, and
so its near­extinction had a profound impact on the American psyche and is credited
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with helping start conservation efforts in the United States. Up until the nineteenth
century, Native Americans hunted bison in what would be today considered a
sustainable way, and so the bison population remained stable. The introduction of
guns and horses in North America, however, changed the way that Native
Americans hunted, and the resulting new premium on mobility sometimes led to
waste, which was previously disavowed by Native American tribes.9) By the start of
the eighteenth century, some Native Americans had shifted from their traditional
pattern of diversified resource use to year­round bison hunting, which not only
sustained their own consumption patterns, but also offered sellable commodities.
The bison robe trade also accelerated at this time, and some Native Americans
mounted on horses and armed with rifles could now hunt bison much more
proficiently and fill the large market demand.10) By the middle of the nineteenth
century, American industrial production led to even greater demand for bison due to
the rise of factories and mills featuring machinery that needed leather belts to
function, particularly bison leather belts, which were especially durable.11) Leather
had become so valuable at this time that tanning was the fifth largest industry in the
United States in 1850, and it expanded considerably over the next thirty years.12)
U.S. political and military interests further spurred, or at least did nothing to
resist, the economic forces that were putting great pressure on the bison population.
By the late nineteenth century, the American government had become interested in
other natural resources, namely ranchlands and goldmines, which sparked military
conflicts with Native American tribes west of Missouri. In the middle of the
nineteenth century, Americans were expanding deeper into the plains that are now
part of the central and western United States and were also expanding to the west
coast. This brought European Americans and Native Americans into conflict, which
was partially resolved with the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The treaty protected
Native American access to bison west of Missouri, but the exact language stipulated
“so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify the
chase.”13)
Part of the bison population’s decimation was instigated by the United States
military, but its impact on the bison population may not have been as extensive as is
often described. For instance, General Sherman, who famously marched on Georgia
and destroyed confederate resources during the American Civil War, did at times
resort to killing bison with the aim of eliminating what was from the American
government’s perspective enemy resources, but this resulted in a relatively minor
decrease in bison population.14) More impactful was the American government’s
vested interests in disregarding violations of the treaty by European American
hunters, who targeted bison for their valuable skins, and in so doing benefited U.S.
interests in two ways. First, increased bison hunting lowered the bison population so
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significantly that the U.S. government was able to force Native Americans onto
reservations, away from land with valuable natural resources.15) Second, increased
bison hunting helped sustain industrial production by supplying mills and factories
with strong bison leather, which as previously mentioned, was crucial to their
operations. All told, then, by the second half of the nineteenth century the bison had
become part of what was effectively an American proxy war against Native
Americans, and had become a central component of the American industrial
revolution. European American expansion helped accelerate industrial production,
further depleting the bison population, and in conjunction with what are typically
termed “natural” factors like drought and bovine diseases, the bison stood on the
brink of extinction by the end of nineteenth century.
The near­extinction of bison herds led to a conservation ethic sparked in large
part by the New York Zoological Society’s director, William Hornaday,16) and with
the realization that numerous other species experienced drastic drops in population,
a number of states began enacting laws that set bag limits on big game hunting.
According to Robert Leo Smith, however, these laws were not primarily seeking to
protect wildlife, but rather, were looking “to ensure hunters a more or less equitable
distribution of what was left.”17) In fact, many advocacy groups for wildlife
preservation were derivative of or backed by hunting enthusiasts and ammunition
manufacturers.18) Interest groups and those concerned with conservation ultimately
set in motion various conservation laws. The Lacey Act of 1900, for example, was
the country’s first significant federal law designed to protect wildlife. The Act,
which has been amended several times since its inception, gave the federal
government control over the trafficking of parts from illegally killed animals and
thereby helped protect “native game animals.”19) Congress has also passed several
species­specific acts, like the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 that in conjunction
with a series of treaty agreements with Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia protects
a selection of migratory birds,20) and the 1940 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act, which makes it a crime to take either of these eagles or engage in trade of
either species.21)
During the first half of the twentieth century as these protective laws were
being passed, it is clear that there was little political concern for endangered species
in general, but instead, the focus was on protecting some species that were
considered valuable commercially or recreationally. The treatment of wolves
illustrates this point, for at the start the twentieth century, the Department of
Agriculture’s Biological Survey’s predator­control unit began exterminating wolves
throughout the United States. This project was funded by Congress, state
governments, and private associations with vested financial interests in the
eradication of wolves, and the aim was to make it easier for livestock and crop
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growth and also increase the supply of wild game like deer.22) This new program
replaced the previous system of random wolf killings by bounty hunters and
ranchers, and by 1950 wolves had been systemically driven to extinction throughout
the continental United States, with the exception of Minnesota.
It was at this time that the United States passed the Agricultural Act of 1956,
which affirmed broad concern with the interrelated nature of agriculture and the
natural environment. “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress and the
purposes of this title,” the Act states, “to protect and increase farm income, to
protect the national soil, water, and forest and wildlife resources from waste and
depletion.” The Act thus recognized that environmental resources, wildlife,
agriculture, and ultimately human welfare in general were intertwined. However,
heightened fears over the prospect of species in North America going extinct despite
existing pieces of federal legislation pushed forward more sweeping legislation in
the form of endangered species acts: the Endangered Species Protection Act of
1966, which was soon replaced with the Endangered Species Conservation act of
1969,23) which in turn was replaced by the landmark Endangered Species Act of
1973.24) This sweeping piece of legislation protects all plant and animal species
facing the threat of extinction anywhere in the United States, irrespective of
worldwide population levels for any given species.25) Placing a species on the
endangered list can override powerful commercial interests, since threatening the
habitat of an endangered species can bring development projects to a standstill and
can significantly impinge on industrial operations: “once a species is placed on the
endangered species list, cost­benefit analysis is practically precluded.”26) As such, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 marked a significant reversal from just a few
decades earlier, when the government helped exterminate wolves due to their
adverse impact on agriculture in America.
IV. Extrinsic Value of Animal Species
in the Implementation of Conservation Efforts27)
While the Act does indeed treat all endangered animal species equally, as
demonstrated by its provision that prioritizes assistance based on likelihood of
benefiting from conservation plans “without regard to taxonomic classification,”
there is evidence indicating that not all endangered species are treated equally in
practice. In 1978, for instance, the discovery of an extraordinarily rare small fish
called a snail darter threatened the Tellico Dam construction project in Tennessee.
The Act was, however, amended so that the project could continue as planned. “One
might imagine a different outcome,” according to James Tober, “had the dam
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threatened not the snail darter but, for example, the bald eagle.”28)
A study by Stephen Kellert and Joyce Berry in 1980 confirms that Americans
did not view all endangered species equally at this time, for their study revealed that
the American public seemed to have a greater awareness of and concern for
“relatively emotional issues involving specific, attractive, large and phylogenetically
‘higher’ animals,” and less concern for “issues involving indirect impacts on wildlife
and dealing with biologically unfamiliar and ‘lower’ animals.”29) Moreover, Kellert
identified, in another study, eight factors that influence the public’s attitude toward
endangered species: (1) the reason why a species is endangered; (2) a species’
aesthetic qualities; (3) a species’ phylogenetic relatedness; (4) a species’ economic
value; (5) knowledge of and familiarity with a species; (6) the people affected by
efforts to protect a species; (7) the cultural and historical relationship with a
particular species; and (8) the perceived humaneness of the activities that are
threatening a particular species.30) Kellert’s detailed surveys of public attitudes
toward endangered species clearly consider issues beyond the focus on utility that
was prevalent in the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century.
However, given that of the eight features listed, the first and the eighth are the only
ones that raise issues that can qualify as matters of ethics, his studies further
validate that the general public in America at the time viewed species primarily in
terms of extrinsic value.
These public attitudes toward endangered species may thus explain why
endangered species, though equally protected by the Endangered Species Act of
1973, have not been treated equally in practice, insofar as the level of funding and
resources devoted to different endangered species has varied considerably from
species to species. “Charismatic mega­fauna” receive by far greater popular attention
in the media, and are often iconic creatures embedded in the human psyche from
childhood when many children have toy animals like bears, lions, and elephants.
“Just knowing that elephants and pandas exist in the wild has value to some
people,” according to economists Andrew Metrick and Martin Weitzman, “[but]
such an effect is likely to be less pronounced for species of wild toads or eels.”31)
Similar to Kellert’s conclusions, Metrick and Weitzman argue that the
considerations that strongly affect sentiment toward preservation are taxonomic
distinctiveness, consciousness and intelligence levels, and perceived degree of
endangerment. After measuring the effects of these four characteristics on funding,
Metrick and Weitzman conclude that government agencies create endangered listings
and allocate funding in ways that favor animals considered “to be higher forms of
life.”32)
Though the study by Metrick and Weitzman also suggests that public attitudes
in the United States in the late twentieth century factored in issues beyond the
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concern with pure utility, as was prevalent earlier in America’s history, it
nonetheless indicates a widespread view of most species having only extrinsic value.
While levels of endangerment and taxonomic distinctiveness influence decisions to
list a species as endangered, these two factors are “overpowered” by visceral factors
like sentient status and popular perception when spending decisions are made.33) A
number of activist groups have seized on this apparent connection by marketing
sponsorship kits based on familiar popular animals like polar bears or dolphins and
link some funding from such sales directly to the type of animal sponsored. The fact
that activist groups frequently draw on “charismatic mega­fauna” like polar bears to
generate funding and to attract potential members reinforces this appraisal of
popular sentiment.
Their analysis of government funding for protecting endangered species in the
United States in the late twentieth century further illustrates this point. Their study
indicates that funding patterns appear to have at this time favored more popular
species rather than the most threatened species. In relation to total government
spending from 1989 to 1991, what can be considered socially preferred species
received the most funding, with just ten species collectively receiving over 54%
percent of funding for endangered species conservation, leaving less than 46% of
funds for all other species. The bald eagle topped the list with $31.3 million in
funding, followed by the northern spotted owl with $26.4 million, and the Florida
scrub jay with $19.9 million. Following these three birds was the West Indian
Manatee, which received $17.3 million in funding, followed by the red­cockaded
woodpecker with $15.1 million, the Florida panther with $13.6 million, and the
grizzly bear with $12.6 million. Three more birds rounded out this top ten list, with
$12.5 million in funding for the least Bell’s vireo, $11.6 million for the American
peregrine falcon, and $10.8 million for the whooping crane.34)
Several of these species were not experiencing a high threat level for going
extinct during the years when these expenditures were recorded, with the grizzly
bear, the bald eagle, and the northern spotted owl at this point all having sufficiently
large breeding populations.35) The Choctawahatchee beach mouse and the Texas
blind salamander, by contrast, were at the time facing a more immediate threat of
extinction. Furthermore, many of these highly funded species are subspecies: a type
of owl, a type of eagle, or a type of bear, for instance. The sand skink and Alabama
cave fish, on the other hand, each constitute a “monotypic genus,” which means
“that they are the genetically distinct unique representative of an entire genus.”36)
Yet, each of these relatively unknown species received less than $10,000 in funding
for preservation.37) Thus, as opposed to factors like genetic uniqueness and actual
threat level being prioritized, it instead appears that popular attraction to a species
and the emotional value of a species to humans appears to have taken precedence in
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the late twentieth century shortly after the Act came into force. In short, though the
Endangered Species Act on paper seemingly treats all species as intrinsically
valuable, funding patterns for conservation efforts at the end of the twentieth
century suggest that the extrinsic value of an animal species plays a sizeable role in
concerns for its survival.
V. Conclusion
Proving that something is truly intrinsically valuable is obviously challenging,
given that one could argue, for instance, that all species contribute to biodiversity,
and the survival of any species in some way, shape, or form contributes to human
wellbeing, if not biologically, then at least emotionally in the form of knowing that
a species has not vanished from existence. However, several key provisions in the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 seemingly constitute species, for all practical
purposes, as intrinsically valuable. Most notably, it protects any animal species that
is classified as endangered, even at the expense of human economic interests. It
does not discriminate according to taxonomic qualities, meaning that it does not
restrict its protections to species that are desirable from a human perspective, and
instead protects both those considered majestic and those considered odious alike. It
also does not discriminate based on the reasons for a species being endangered. This
means that it not only protects species that human activities have endangered, but it
also protects species that face the threat of extinction due to what are viewed as
natural reasons.
A long history of focusing on the extrinsic value of animals and species in
general belies the Endangered Species Act’s valuation of animal species. Indeed the
origin of conservation efforts in America appears to have arisen partly out of
concern over the prospect of losing majestic species like the bison, which was
emblematic of the American plains. Similarly, those with vested material interests in
wildlife, like hunters and ammunition manufacturers, contributed to early
conservation efforts and legislation protecting wildlife. The actual implementation of
conservation efforts in the two decades that followed the Act’s implementation also
seemingly focused on the extrinsic value of animal species. Most notably, the
funding levels for endangered species clearly benefited species that Americans hold
dear far more than lesser­known species, so much so that in the period from 1989 to
1991 ten species in particular collectively received over half of government funds
for conservation efforts.
Material interests that coincided with ethical ideals have clearly proven
invaluable to the start of conservation efforts in America by setting legislation in
motion, which ultimately culminated in the creation of a powerful piece of
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legislation in the form of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Moreover, the
emphasis on popular species in implementing the Act’s provisions may have also
proven invaluable, for setting aside millions of dollars in government budgets for
the sake of protecting iconic species was undoubtedly politically more feasible than
doing the same for unknown species, as evidenced by the study by Kellert and
Berry. Focusing on notable species helped solidify the concept of government
spending on endangered species protection, making it easier to then spend on lesser
known endangered species, and indeed this approach of focusing on iconic species
in general has proven crucial to conservation efforts during this time by
environmental non­government organizations as well.38) Essentially, once people
come to realize that the world would be profoundly emptier without certain iconic
species in the wild, this sentiment can broaden to include lesser known species as
well. Not surprisingly, then, the case of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
reinforces that when it comes to wildlife conservation, there is an important
interplay between ethical ideals and practical interests, and though the former may
be relatively easy to establish on paper, it is typically the latter that prevails in
practice.
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